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FEDERALISM, BOUNDARY CONFLICTS AND
RESPONSIBLE FINANCIAL REGULATION
WILLIAM

I.

A. LOVETT*

INTRODUCTION

The United States faces a potential stampede of financial merger activity.1 This merger and consolidation trend, if accelerated by the drastic
deregulation or restructuring legislation under Senate consideration,
could alter fundamentally the nature of American capitalism.2 Although
* Professor of Law and Economics, Tulane University School of Law. B.A., 1956, Wabash College; L.L.B., 1959, New York University; Ph.D., 1967, Michigan State University.
Member, New York bar.
The text of this Article comprised, in substantially similar form, Mr. Lovett's testimony
before the House Banking Committee on April 11, 1984. See FinancialDeregulation: How the
FinancialSystem Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-90
(1984) (statement of William A. Lovett). See also Competitive Equity in the FinancialServices
Industry: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1144-56 (statement of William A. Lovett). The current Article includes footnotes by the author.
1. Bank merger activity has been increasing rapidly. For example, in 1975, there were
138 mergers and $7.1 billion in assets acquired. In 1980, there were 190 mergers and $19.8
billion in assets acquired, and in 1982, there were 437 mergers and $47.2 billion in assets
acquired. See S. RHOADES, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY COMMERICAL BANKS, 1960-83,
Staff Studies No. 142 (1984) (Federal 1teserve Board). Recently, antitrust limitations were
relaxed even more. See W. LOvE'r, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW ch. 3
(1984). Moreover, on October 15, 1984, Comptroller of the Currency, C. Todd Conover, announced the lifting of his moratorium on nonbank banks. Many observers interpreted the
action as further encouragement for bank expansion, interstate banking and financial conglomerates. Some 329 applications for nonbank charters were pending, designed to take advantage
of this rapidly expanding loophole. See Analysff'Examine CourtRuling Effect on Fed's Reg. Y,
Am. Bankers A. Bankers News Weekly, Oct. '2, 1984, at 1; Conover Lifts Nonbank-Bank Ban,
Am. Bankers A. Bankers News Weekly, Oct. 23, 1984, at 1; OCC Set to Begin Approving
Nonbank Bank Applications, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 532 (1984); OCC Lifts Moratoriumon Nonbank Bank Charters, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 607 (1984); Fed to Rule on Four Nonbank Bank
Applications by Early November, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 608 (1984); Conover Says Nonbank
Banks Should Start Up Quickly; More OCC Decisions Soon, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 657 (1984);
"Non-LeadingLeaders" in House Blamed on Nonbank Bank Issue by ABA Official, 43 WASH.
FIN. REP. 662 (1984); Gorton Tells ABA Quick Senate Action Likely on Bank Powers,Nonbank
Banks, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 664 (1984). Most of the largest United States banks applied for
multistate charters this way, and if approved by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
(OCC), the Federal Reserve Board, and courts, the pace of interstate expansion and mergers
would be greatly accelerated.
2. See W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 382-97. See also FinancialDeregulation How the
FinancialSystem Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People: Hearings
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most United States multinational banks suffer strain and vulnerability

due to excessive loans to developing countries, this does not justify drastic increases in concentration of United States financial institutions, or

3
their transformation into a network dominated by giant conglomerates.

Congress should continue the progress it has made in the late 1970's and
early 1980's with gradual, carefully discussed, and deliberate deregulation. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 19801 and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of

1982' brought greater rivalry to American financial markets, along with
greater access to higher interest rates for small savers. This is a constructive development. But Congress must safeguard the long term interest of
the economy, consumers, small and large business, communities all over
the nation, and our traditions of decentralized free enterprise in
America.'
II.

OVERALL GOALS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATION

Formulating sound goals for monetary, banking, and financial institutions policy is essential.7 This strategy should help promote economic
growth, ample savings and efficient investment, full employment and low
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-135,
189-209 (1984) (statements of William A. Lovett and David M. Kotz) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing on FinancialDeregulation]. The original Gain bill would have encouraged nationwide financial conglomerates by greatly expanding the powers of bank holding companies. S.
2181, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in Competitive Equity in the FinancialServices
Industry: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-128 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Competitive Equity].
3. Other remedies are sufficient for easing the strain on international banking. They include rescheduling and stretchout relief, additional lending, reduced budget deficits, declining
interest rates, International Monetary Fund stabilization discipline, and perhaps, moderately
increased international liquidity through the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and
other multilateral institutions. See infra notes 36-39.
4. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
5. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
6. For further elaboration of the need for gradual, careful progress toward financial deregulation, see Hearings on FinancialDeregulation,supra note 2, at 67-90 (statement of William A. Lovett); Hearings on Competitive Equity, supra note 2, at 1144-56 (statement of
William A. Lovett), 1168-74.
7. For more complete background on United States financial institution policies, see generally W. LOVETr, supra note 1. Another convenient review is provided in Shepherd & Heggestad, The BankingIndustry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY ch. 9 (W. Adams
ed. 6th ed. 1982). Chairman Paul Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board summarized relevant
goals as follows: (1) fair competition; (2) efficiency and minimal cost to consumers; (3) protections against concentration of economic resources, discrimination, conflict of interest, and
other possible abuses; and (4) a strong and stable financial system, with continuing attention to
safety and soundness. Hearingson FinancialDeregulation,supra note 2, at 1680 (statement of
Paul A. Volcker).
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inflation. Interest rates and financial service charges should be used to
achieve these goals, but should not be excessive or unreasonably discriminatory. Vigorous competition among financial institutions is needed,
with relatively easy entry, but participants must be responsible and properly capitalized. Large multinational institutions are desirable for many
purposes, yet excessive concentration or domination by these firms is undesirable. Decentralized enterprise and healthy local institutions are important in federal democracy, and their vitality should be encouraged.
A continuing flow of international trade, investment, credit and financial services is essential for world prosperity. Adequate liquidity, access to borrowing, reliable debt service, and responsible national
economic policies should be linked together. Healthy economic recoveries, with low inflation, and a minimum of disruption or defaults are
desirable for the community of nations.
Regulatory authorities should work to achieve these objectives.
Continued integrity of financial institutions and public confidence is indispensable. Equitable treatment of customers and institutions has been
established as legal policy, and this policy should be maintained. Institutions must be carefully supervised, with appropriate discipline for accountability (including their international activities). Regulatory
agencies, legislative oversight, and executive coordination should function smoothly and expeditiously to achieve these ends.
III.

MAIN THEMES OF UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
LAW

Federalism and the desire for decentralized financial institutions
have been powerful themes in American law.8 The nation fashioned a
successful network of very large banks, including the world's biggest
(Citicorp and Bank of America), along with large nationwide securities
firms and insurance companies. 9 These separate industries already compete to a considerable extent with each other. More significantly, these
powerful institutions are subject to the healthy competitive discipline of a
few hundred regional banks, about 14,000 community banks, 4000 savings institutions, and 20,000 credit unions, along with thousands of securities dealers and insurance companies. The result has been a sound
mixture, with good competition in each industry, and enough rivalry be8. For historical background, see generally W. LOvETr, supra note 1; P. STUDENSKI &
H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1963). For special insight into the
political tradition against concentrated power in banking, see R. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON
AND THE BANK WAR (1967).
9. See infra Appendix, at 1074; see generally W. LovErr, supra note 1.
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tween these industries, to serve customers well throughout the country,
and to prevent excessive domination by the giants from the leading financial centers.
But there is already ample concentration in each of these industries,
and we should not let them become much more concentrated. In banking, for example, the top fifty banks already have roughly half of United
States total banking assets (including international activities), or as much
financial weight as the remaining 14,500 banks altogether. (See Appendix). In securities distribution and underwriting, and the insurance industry, there is even greater nationwide concentration. There is no need
for any significant enlargement of this aggregate concentration, and we
should ensure that our present system continues. We should be proud of
our decentralized finance and capitalism. It helps promote efficiency,
competitive pricing and interest rates, along with fair access to credit for
small business, housing, and other needs. Decentralization fosters social
mobility, political pluralism, economic development and self-respect all
over the country.
The crucial reasons for this decentralized success are the McFadden-Douglas boundaries"° on bank branching and bank holding companies, the Bank Holding Company Acts of 1956 and 1970,11 the GlassSteagall Act' 2 and its general separation of securities marketing from
banking, and the state insurance regulation system."' Recent legislation,
including the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980'" and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982,15 have brought additional competition gradually without excessive disruption to this financial network. 6 We should continue careful,
deliberate progress in the same manner.
Fortunately, there are no great scale economies for banks or depository institution operations that require drastic restructuring or enlarged
10. The McFadden Act of 1927, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982), and the Douglas Amendment to
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982), restrict the ability of
banks to expand beyond state lines.
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982). See W. LovETr, supra note 1, at 150-78,
12. The Glass-Steagall Act is the common name for four sections of the Banking Act of
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1976). See also W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 135-38, 382-97.
13. See W. LOVETT, supra note 1, at 298-334; P. STUDENSKI & H. KRoosS, FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1963); J. WHITE, BANKING LAW (1976); Lovett &
Devkins, Multiple Office Banking and Market Extension Mergers, 57 N.C.L. REv. 261 (1979).
14. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
15. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
16. See W. LOvETr, supra note 1, at 21-22, 98-297, 382-97.
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concentration in these markets. 7 Most banking market economists agree
that economies of scale cease to be significant much beyond $50 million
to $100 million in assets. 8 Moreover, computer technology is so powerful that it can adapt to all sizes of depository institution and banking
activities. 9 Continuing antitrust protection should be encouraged in order to prevent any artificial market leverage over computerized
technology.
Another basic theme of our modem financial institutions law is
close supervision, accountability, and regulation to ensure fiduciary responsibility by banks, insurance companies, and those holding securities
and pension fund assets.2" Gradually, with efforts by many legislators at
federal and state levels, we have developed a system that works well now.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), and National Credit Union
Share Insurance Fund protect depository institutions. Together with the
limited Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for pension funds and the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation for securities firms, they provide much more safety and soundness, and the basis for stronger accountability. Of fundamental importance are the depository insurance
achievements, which have largely eliminated bank runs and widespread
insecurity for banks and thrift institutions. 2 This federal deposit insurance tradition is backed up by supervision disciplines, and lender of last
resort financing from the Federal Reserve system.2 2
17. For an introduction to this literature, see Shepherd & Heggestad, The Banking Industry, in THE STRucTuRE OF AMERICAN INDuSTRY 330-38 (W. Adams ed. 6th ed. 1982).

18. For reviews of the literature on scale economies in banking, see McCall, Economies of
Scale, Operating Eff ciencies and the OrganizationalStructure of Commercial Banks, 11 J.
BANK RESEARCH 95 (1980); Benston, Hanweck, & Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking:
4 Restructuring and Reassessment, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 435 (1982); S.
RHIOADES, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK MERGER POLICY OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION,
INTERSTATE BANKING, AND FINANCIAL SUPERMARKETS, Staff Studies No. 137 (1984) (Federal Reserve Board).

19. See W. Lovhr, supra note 1, at 178-81. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER, EFT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1977); W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER, & K. ScOr, RETAIL BANKING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS

OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER 50-70 (1977); J.R.S. REVELL, BANKING AND ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS (1983); Jones, U.S. Banks Experiment with Home Banking,
BANKER, Jan. 1984, at 61.
20. See W. LovETT, supra note 1, at 109-28, 213-22, 228-39, 279-320, 351-59; J. WHITE,
BANKING LAW chs. 2, 3 (1976); INTER-BANK RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, THE REGULATION
OF BANKS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC (1978); H. BAER, THE BANKING SYSTEM OF
SWITZERLAND (1964).

21. See W. LOvEr, supra note 1, at 109-28, 213-22, 228-39, 279-320, 351-59; P. STUDENsKu & H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1963).

22. Id.
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We learned in previous depressions what disasters could flow from
speculative booms and financial panic. Most of us now assume that modem banking and thrift institution regulation would prevent any future
recurrence of such a tragedy. We should always remember that in the
Great Depression nearly half the bank liquidity and savings of the country were destroyed, national income was cut in half, and one-fourth of
the labor force was unemployed for years.23 As a result, modem regulation followed for these institutions, and failures became quite rare between 1940 and 1980.24 They should not be allowed to run rampant in
the future.2" Continued regulation must be even more vigilant, because
bf strain flowing from overloads of indebtedness in international banking
during the late 1970's and early 1980's.26 In certain respects, the excessive buildup of international lending and borrowing represents another
big speculative boom, connected with worldwide inflation and deficit finance. We are forced to live with its consequences throughout the
1980's, and perhaps beyond, and must act with great care in regulating
financial markets.
Reasonable safety and soundness for banks and other financial institutions require adequate reserves and capital accounts, together with regular inspection of asset quality and loan portfolios.27 Greater attention
must be paid to the matching of maturities between liabilities (deposits,
certificates of deposit, borrowing and capital funds) and assets (loans,
mortgages, securities, Treasury bills and cash reserves) in supervising
modem asset-liability management techniques. 28 Fortunately, computer
age technology makes safety and soundness easier to maintain, provided
that federal agencies have full access to current computer runs on these
matters.
It is also important that banks, other depository institutions, and
23. See W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 47-49.
24. Iad at 109-28.
25. Recently, significant concern has been expressed about a substantial increase in the
rate of bank failures between 1982 and 1984. See, e.g., Dentzer, Ma, MeAlevey & Leslie,
Keeping the Banks Afloat, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1984, at 54; Isaac Warns of Bank Nationalization: Predicts75 Bank Failuresfor Year, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 653 (1984); ParteeSees Deregulation Leading to Need for Increased Supervision, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 618 (1984); Knapp,
Penn Square Revisited, BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 75; How Not to Run a MoneyCenter Bank The Report of ContinentalIllinois Corporation'sSpecial Litigation Committee,
INT'L CURRENCY REv., Sept. 1984, at 14; Thurow, America's Banks in Crisis, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 1984, (Magazine), at 48; Inter-agency Feuding and the Penn Square Fiasco, INT'L
CURRENCY REv., Oct. 1982, at 31.
26. See infra notes 36 & 40.
27. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
28. For a brief introduction to current liability management techniques, see Rohlwink,
How Asset and LiabilityManagement Improves Performance,BANKER, Mar. 1984, at 41.
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insurance companies remain sufficiently separated so that accounting integrity, reserves, and capital can be securely maintained.2 9 The worst
dangers in financial institutions management include the commingling of
assets, borrowing, and the sharing of losses among related entities of a
conglomerate enterprise.30 The most common source of institutional
failure results from self-dealing transactions among corporate insiders
and related companies in a conglomerate family of enterprises. Leaders
in these enterprises are tempted to cover up misuse of bank, insurance,
pension or other assets, and to conceal their maladministration and
breach of fiduciary responsibilities. All too often the weaknesses in their
other enterprises (whether real estate development, mineral exploration,
or foreign investment, among others) are not rectified, and the bank or
financial institution fails, with substantial losses to the public or federal
insurance liabilities.
For these reasons banking and depository institution activities, insurance marketing and underwriting, and the marketing and distribution
of securities should remain separate as independent, unrelated industries.3 ' Safety and soundness of banks and insurance companies can be
better supervised this way. Meanwhile, the securities industry is regulated quite differently by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
supervised disclosure mechanism and the SEC's regulation of the securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers.3 2
. Finally, we should realize that the fiduciary character of banking,
savings and loans, mutual savings banks and credit unions, together with
insurance companies, is well established under American law. 33 They
have special responsibilities and duties to the public. The economy depends upon their reliability and financial soundness. Banking and insurance should not be fields for speculative adventures or free-wheeling, fast
29. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
Y0. For the classic illustration of conglomerate risk management problems, see the case
study on United States National Bank, concerning deposit assumption in large banks. J.
WHITE, BANKING LAW 833-47 (1976).
31. See generally W. LovETr, supra note 1. Proper supervision of depository institution
and insurance companies requires administrative accountability. Securities regulation, by contrast, relies upon public disclosure and investor litigation disciplines. If holding companies are
allowed to commingle activities from all these areas, sound regulatory supervision could be
easily weakened. Conceivably, a coordinated multi-industry system could evolve eventually at
the federal level, but this would require unusual effort to harmonize all agencies involved and
would probably entail federal insurance regulation.
32. See id. at 261-70. See also D. RATNER, SEcurITInS REGULATION 150-91 (1978); R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS (5th ed. 1982); N. WOLFSON, CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST: INVESTMENT BANKING (1976).

33. See W. LovETr, supra note 1, at chs. 2, 3, 4, 6.
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buck profit promoters. 34 They are by nature well-regulated, closely supervised, conservative industries, that have a long tradition of fiduciary
accountability and responsibility to the public interest. These industries
have benefited from healthy competition and a great deal of decentralization. This blend of supervised competition and localized service is in the
best interests of the public and the economy.
IV.

SPECIAL CHALLENGES FOR THE

1980's

During this decade, Congress faces four major challenges that affect
the regulation of banking and financial institutions: (1) excessive government deficits; (2) international debt overloads and rescheduling strains;
(3) controversies between large and small financial institutions around
the country over boundaries between banks, thrifts, securities firms, and
insurance companies; and (4) the regulatory framework for supervising
financial markets. These problems are interrelated, and call into question
certain aspects of financial institutions regulation.
A.

Budget Deficit Problems

The gravity of our budget deficit problem is now widely recognized
in financial circles around the world.3" During the next year or two,
Congress should agree on a sensible, long run compromise for spending
priorities and a bearable tax load. Once the structural deficit gap is eliminated, a substantial consensus on pragmatic monetary policy will be easier to achieve. Long term interest rates should fall substantially, with
significant alleviation for the domestic economy, and a better climate
within which to resolve international debt rescheduling problems.
34. In the history of banking and insurance, unusually rapid growth and short-term profits
are often associated with higher risk investment and loans, the purchase or recruitment of
additional deposits or policies with generous terms or conditions, and/or reducing capital and
reserves, thereby increasing leverage and potential vulnerability. The most speculative and
adventurous strategies often have brought failures to their institutions, and therefore are discouraged by more experienced industry leaders. For a recent restatement of this traditional,
conventional wisdom, see Address by C.T. Conover, Commercial Lending: Back to the Basics,
Robert Morris Associates Fall Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico (Oct. 31, 1984).
35. For the importance of fiscal discipline and deficit reduction, see W. LOVETr, supra
note 1, at 374-82; W. LovEIT, INFLATION AND POLITICS: FISCAL, MONETARY, AND WAGEPRICE DISCIPLINE (1982); UNITED STATES COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS (1984); A. RIVLIN, ECONOMIC CHOICES 1984
at 19-43 (1984); P. ERDMAN, PAUL ERDMAN'S MONEY BOOK: AN INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (1984). The Federal Reserve Board has also emphasized the importance of budgetary restraint especially during the 1980's. For critical views abroad, see

West Germany's Schmidt at ABA Warns US. About Budget, Trade Deficits, 43 WASH. FIN.
REP. 667 (1984).

SYMPOSIUM

1985]

B.

1061

InternationalDebt Rescheduling

Unfortunately, the international debt rescheduling crisis is more serious than most people realize.3 6 Less developed countries (LDC's) have
about $850 billion in foreign debt, roughly half owed to international
banks.37 United States multinational banks have the largest chunk of
these loans ($175 billion), an amount substantially larger than the net
capital of our biggest banks involved.3 8 This exposure is dangerous to
banking solvency in the United States, and a chain reaction of LDC defaults could reverse economic recovery in many countries. Widespread
defaults would forebode a dreary situation for the United States government. The government could be forced to bail out the big banks, which
would necessitate creating more money with more inflation, or increasing
government debts and deficits, or enlarging tax revenues substantially to
cover these losses (in some combination or other).
Unhappily, the LDC debt crisis could last another five to ten years,
depending partly on the speed with which the United States and other
major industrial countries eliminate their own budget deficits. If the
United States takes a long time to achieve budget discipline, with continued high interest rates in the interim, the period of rescheduling crisis
and strain for American multinational banks will be lengthened accordingly. Thus, the world debt crisis, major American bank vulnerability,
and excessive budget deficits are tragically linked. It seems likely that
part of the LDC debt load may have to be written off as a loss, though
this may be accomplished gradually with skillful regulatory
supervision.3 9
What are the implications for financial markets and their regulation? The main conclusions are the following. (1) United States bank
36. For current reviews of the world debt crisis, see P. ERDMAN, PAUL ERDMAN'S
MONEY BOOK: AN INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (1984); Symposium on
World Debt and The Monetary Order,4 CATo J. (1984); W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT:
SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE (1984); Lovett, Managing the World Debt Crisis: Alternative Solutions andEconomic Strains, - STAN. J. INT'L L. - (1985) (forthcoming); Bergstrand, Bretton Woods Revisited, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 23 (Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston); H. Terrell, Bank Lending to Developing Countries: Recent Developments and Some Considerationsfor the Future, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 755 (1984); J. MAKIN, THE
GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS: AMERICA'S GROWING INVOLVEMENT (1984).

37. Lovett, Managing the World Debt Crisis: Alternative Solutions and Economic Strains,
STAN. J. INT'L L.

-

(1985) (forthcoming).

38. Id. See also H. Terrell, Bank Lending to Developing Countries: Recent Developments
and Some Considerationsfor the Future, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 755 (1984).
39. As developing countries insist upon reduced interest rates on existing external debts as
a precondition for servicing these debts (even under liberal rescheduling arrangements), the
profitability of these loans should decline. See, eg., Witcher, Banks Give Ground on Mexico
Debt Terms in Exchangefor Close Watch on Economy, Wall. St. J., Aug. 30, 1984, at 23, col. 1.
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regulators, supervision, and Congress must be more vigilant than ever.
We are living on the edge of major financial fragility for ourselves and
the world economy, in a period of strain that could last for five to ten

years. (2) We should avoid radical, rapid restructuring of financial markets, and prevent a stampede of destabilizing mergers.'

These markets

already have suffered major strains from electronic funds transfer and
computer technology and increased competition for deposits and higher
interest rates. Savings institutions have been burdened by older, low in-

terest mortgage portfolios. Happily, few institutions have failed so far,
and disruption to depositors, the public, and our economy has remained

at a minimum. (3) We should continue the recent pattern of gradual,
deliberate, and carefully discussed progress in allowing more competition

for financial markets. Major gains for the public interest have been
achieved with incremental, methodical deregulation, and responsible regulatory supervision.41 We should not discard accumulated success,
thereby upsetting an already shaky world financial situation.
C. Boundary Controversies
There is a Great Boundary Fight now underway-between large
and small financial institutions, between banks, thrifts, securities firms
and insurance companies, and among the states. 42 This boundary controversy intensified during the late 1970's when money market funds and

cash management accounts broke into traditional deposit markets of
banks, and especially thrift institutions. By the early 1980's, after inter-

national banking lost its growth momentum, some of the nation's biggest
banks, led by Citicorp, urged that boundaries between all financial institutions be drastically reduced, so that inter-industry mergers could occur
40. A rapid stampede of bank mergers and takeover efforts would destabilize management
for many financial institutions, increase pressures for accounting manipulation, and maximize
the incentive for the appearance of high profitability. With increased variability of interest
rates, thinner profit margins and a serious overhang of LDC debts, troubled energy and agriculture loans, and other strained industries, it would be disruptive to encourage this radical,
rapid restructuring now, particularly since many thrift institutions have not recovered fully
from severe disintermediation in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
As Federal Reserve Board Governor J. Charles Partee observed recently, deregulation of
interest rate ceilings paid on depositors' funds has made the cost of funding substantially
greater and more volatile than ever. He noted a tendency "to squeeze operating margins and
to increase incentives to find higher yielding assets, by capitalizing on market advantages, by
taking more risks or by moving out on an upward sloping yield curve." Partee considers the
latter two alternatives "very dangerous," and noted that the "increased risk of major missteps
heighten[s] the need for close monitoring and supervision." ParteeSees DeregulationLeading
to Need for Increased Supervision, 43 WAsH. FIN. REP. 618 (1984).
41. See supra notes 13 & 16 and accompanying text.
42. See W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 382-97.
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on a large scale, thereby encouraging the creation of nationwide financial
43
conglomerates (with banking, insurance, and securities subsidiaries).

Some major securities firms, including Merrill Lynch, sought to participate in this trend. Several .conglomerates involving securities were
formed, such as Sears-Allstate-Dean Witter-Coldwell Banker (retailing,
insurance, securities and real estate), Shearson-American Express (brokerage, credit cards and travel), and Prudential-Bache (insurance and se-

curities), which could be leaders in such a transformation.'

Another

complication was than some of the weakened and large savings and loans
needed to be recapitalized due to their earnings squeeze in the late 1970's
to early 1980's, which led to some major savings and loan mergers, in-

cluding a few acquisitions by leading banks.45 A final factor was confusion among regulatory agencies over nonbank banks, i.e., a loophole
under the Bank Holding Company Act46 which allowed the acquisition
or establishment of banks that merely perform one of the two primary
bank functions, i.e., accepting deposits or making commercial loans.4 7 A
variety of outside companies, including a savings and loan affiliate (Dimension Financial Corp.) have established, or are attempting to estab-

lish, nonbank banks as a step toward wider market participation. Many
major banks are eager now to establish nationwide deposit collection

networks.
There is no coherent consensus among the banking, thrift, insurance, and securities industries on these boundary issues.4 8 Some partici-

pants argue that they should grow and profit at the expense of other
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). See also Constitutionalityof State Nonbank Bank Laws
Debated at Fed Staff Hearing,44 WASH. FiN. REP. 225 (1985).
47. See supra notes 1 & 42.
48. W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 382-97. Some of the largest multinational banks support
nationwide banking, with broadened powers, including insurance, securities, and real estate.
They are positioned to exploit such growth and merger opportunities advantageously, and the
top 10 to 15 banks also suffer serious overloads in developing country loans (with potential
insolvency risk if many defaults occur). Many large regional banks, on the other hand, fear
pre-emption and dominance by the largest banks in any rapid merger stampede. They prefer
regional bank expansion in various sections of the country to nationwide growth. The majority of smaller and independent banks support traditional McFadden-Douglas state boundaries
on deposit gathering, although many would endorse broader bank powers. Thrift institutions
support established boundaries, for the most part, though some large thrifts think more like
regional banks. (Most banks oppose upgrading thrift charters to equality with bank powers).
The insurance industry generally resists the idea of giving markets to banks, especially the
smaller companies and independent agents. Likewise the real estate industry fears invasion by
banks, their traditional suppliers of credit. Securities marketing firms and mutual funds generally oppose significant broadening of bank powers, and insist that money market funds are not
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industries, but this selfish outlook tends to be resisted (not surprisingly)
by many firms that would suffer in the restructuring process. Nor has
there been sufficient agreement among the regulatory agencies. 49 These
conflicts pose serious questions for Congress, and new legislation will not
be easily enacted under these circumstances. °
In this situation Congress should move carefully, and avoid any
stampede metality. Market forces at work could solve many problems
without drastic legislative action or radical restructuring of the financial
markets. As long as Congress avoids drastic restructuring, and continues
to support the established tripartite system of financial regulation (banking and depository institutions, insurance companies, and securities
firms), the artificial profit prospects and gains that would flow from a
nationwide stampede of merger activity should ease and cool down.
When this mood for radical, quick transformation passes, further investments in boundary probes and interpenetrations will have to justify
themselves by the cold reality of market performance. In this light, we
really full-service banking activities. Throughout this fighting over boundaries there is a parochial attitude and a tendency to claim public advantages for their own objectives.
. From a broad public interest standpoint, however, one must bear
in mind such considerations as federalism and independent financial enterprise in community life, along with the great
benefits of inter-industry competition, product rivalry, and innovation.
49. Much of the advocacy for eliminating established boundaries has come from former
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, and his appointee, Comptroller of the Currency, C. Todd
Conover. See, e.g., Hearings on FinancialDeregulation,supra note 2, at 1626-34 (statement of
C. Todd Conover). FDIC Chairman Wfilim Isaac has followed suit, but wants stronger enforcement powers to deal with unsound banks and authority to vary insurance assessments
according to risk. See, e.g., Hearings on FinancialDeregulation, supra note 2, at 1588-97
(statement of William Isaac). The Federal Reserve takes a much more cautious stance on
powers and interstate expansion, and will defer to congressional compromises. But the Federal Reserve strongly supports ending the nonbank loophole, eliminating the "South Dakota
problem" (which allowed out-of-state banks to set up South Dakota insurance subsidiaries to
sell insurance only in other states), and streamlined procedures for administration of the Bank
Holding Company Act. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board and National Credit Union
Adminstration have taken cautious positions, emphasizing the need to maintain the health and
vitality of their industries. See, e.g., Hearingson FinancialDeregulation,supranote 2, at 160022 (statement of Edwin J. Gray, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
50. Senator Gorton (R. Wash.) offered a frank assessment of legislative prospects of 1985,
explaining that the nonbank bill (closing this loophole) was popular but "held hostage to the
passage of broader legislation." He suggested that only modest powers expansion was likely,
rather like the greatly stripped down version of powers expansion (S. 2851) that passed the
Senate at the close of the 1984 session. Gorton Tells ABA Quick SenateAction Likely on Bank
Powers, Nonbank Banks, 43 WASH. FIN. RnxP. 664 (1984). Conover supported closing the
loophole if "significant new powers" were given to banks. He deemed the Senate-passed Gan
bill (S.285 1) "barely acceptable" in this area. Conover Says Nonbank Banks Should Start Up
Quickly; More OCC Decisions Soon, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 657 (1984). Since the congressional
party and ideological balance did not change much in the November 1984 elections, reduced
objectives seem realistic.
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should see traditional market specialization patterns reasserting themselves, with limited room for sustainable changes.5 1
In banking, some states are experimenting with limited, carefully
52
regulated access for out-of-state bank investments and merger activity.
Each state should accept only those bank holding company transactions
that benefit its own citizens, business activity, and/or financial enterprises.5 3 Thus, the pace of overall interstate banking activity will slacken
greatly, the evolving pattern of banking strength will be more evenly divided and balanced among the states and major cities, and banking mergers will remain less highly concentrated. McFadden-Douglas boundaries
should be retained throughout this process, so that a nationwide stampede or chain reaction of interstate banking mergers can be prevented.
Thus, the banking tradition, with its independence and vitality for local
51. Establishing new business and customer loyalties normally requires substantial time,
effort and investment in financial and human resources. This helps explain natural specialization patterns, and their relative stability. A gradual erosion of boundaries is preferable to a
drastic destablization that undercuts the markets, good will, and investments of well-established and respectable enterprises. This applies particularly to financial intermediaries, with
strong reliance interests built up for their customers, depositors, borrowing clientele, and communities being served. Recent strains from excessive inflation, deflationary discipline and
greater variability of interest rates, confused expectations, and risk enhancement have created
enough difficulty. Radical regulatory changes that might need rapid alteration and relief are
not desirable in the financial markets. Evolutionary progress is preferable for most interests,
and will better serve the public over the long run.
52. The current trend toward interstate banking or deposit gathering is cautious, limited,
and non-uniform. A few states are permissive, some allow limited (non-homogeneous) regional compacts, but thus far most states have taken no action whatsoever. See, e.g., Peagam,
Speeding TowardsInterstateBanking, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1984, at 81-84; AntitrustLaws Won't
Prevent Bank Industry Concentration,PanelTold, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. 792 (1984); Dunham &
Syron, InterstateBanking: The Drive to Consolidate,NEw ENGLAND ECON. REv., May-June
1984, at 11 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston); Syron, The "New England Experiment" in
InterstateBanking, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 5 (Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston); Address by Emmett J. Rice on Progress Toward Interstate Banking, Before the
National Association of Urban Bankers (June 21, 1984); Anderson, Buynak & Balazsy, Jr.,
Regional InterstateBanking, ECON. COMMENTARY, June 18, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland); Buynak, Anderson & Balazsy, Jr., Banking Without Interstate Barriers,EON.
COMMENTARY, Mar. 12, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Pavel, 1984 Bank Structure Conference Highlights, EON. PERSP., July-Aug. 1984, at 13 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago); Osborn, How the Sunbelt Can Build the World's Biggest Bank, EUROMONEY, Aug.
1984, at 60; Fraser, Structuraland Competitive Implications of InterstateBanking, 9 J. CORP.
L. 643 (1984); Ginsburg, The Futureof InterstateBanking, 9 J. CoRP.L. 655 (1984); Frieder,
Legislatingfor Interstate Bank Expansion: Financial Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J.
CoRP. L. 673 (1984); Regional Compacts Called Intermediate Step to Full-Scale Interstate
Banking, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 537 (1984); EightMidwest States ConsiderRegionalBanking,43
WASH. FIN. REP. 668 (1984).
53. This solution is better suited to incremental, non-destablizing "reform" in financial
markets, and it imposes a sound test for real benefit to the states, cities and communities
involved.
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and regional banks, can be preserved as much as possible, and American
banking will remain more competitive as an industry.

For thrift institutions (savings and loans and savings banks) this
gradual evolution will be less threatening, and more favorable to their
recovery from a squeeze on earnings (between older mortgage revenues
and the rising cost of funds) in the late 1970's and early 1980's.14 Some
thrifts are developing a new strategy for the later 1980's, with more so-

phisticated real estate investment programs. Many thrifts will continue
the tradition role of taking medium-term deposits and investing in longer
term mortgages, with.more sales of mortgages to the secondary market.
Other thrifts may upgrade themselves to the role of commercial banks,
which might be encouraged further by federal and state chartering au-

thorities. Credit unions are more highly differentiated, and should be less
affected by these developments, except that credit unions are an effective

pressure for healthy price competition in financial markets."
Insurance companies will gradually receive more competition, with
some states leading the way. 6 The trend toward more direct-writer
competition and price rivalry should be strengthened. But it would be
undesirable to open the gates, all at once, to a stampede of insurance

company takeovers by large banks, securities firms, and other outside
corporations. This would disrupt the health of many insurers and independent insurance agencies, and increase dangers of fraudulent manipulation and misuse of insurance reserves and capital.5 7 In the long run, a
54. Thrift institutions have suffered a hard passage in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and
have not fully recovered. See W. LovErr, supra note 1, at 226-47. See also Bennett, Restructuring the S&L Industry, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER, Jan. 11, 1985 (Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco).
55. See, e.g., Hearingson Competitive Equity, supra note 2, at 1350-51 (statement of Edgar
F. Callahan, Chairman, National Credit Union Administration); W. LOvETr, supra note 1, at
248-60.
56. For general background on insurance regulation and trends, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS, REPORT TO CONGRESS (1979); A. TOBIAS, THE
INVISIBLE BANKERS (1982); R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE (7th ed.

1980); C. WILLIAMS & R. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE (4th ed. 1981); INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969); W.
LOVEr, supra note 1, at 298-334.
57. Adequate reserves are needed to support insurance company obligations under their
contracts. Life insurance reserve requirements are based upon mortality experience and interest accumulation projections. For property and liability insurers, loss reserves and unearned
premium reserves should be maintained. These requirements provide the resources to meet
expenses, liabilities, and to prevent insolvency. Examination of assets and policy valuation is
needed for these purposes, along with regulations and supervision to minimize fraud, embezzlement, and unsound investment practices. Insolvency associations are generally desirable,
especially for property-liability insurance. See W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 298-334.
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federal insurance agency may be helpful in supervising the insurance industry, but it would be prudent to move this way deliberately, with extensive hearings, studies, and discussion for all interests affected.5 8

Securities marketing is, for the most part, properly segregated from
commercial banking and insurance.5 9 As a separate industry, the securi-

ties industry brought helpful competition to the financial sector. Mutual
funds and money market funds have made banking and thrift institutions
more competitive, and have helped to eliminate excessively low Regula-

tion Q ceilings on deposit interest rates. Without this outside competition, American savers would still be contending with much lower interest

rates.o Money market accounts offered by depository institutions now
compete effectively with money market mutual funds. The Glass-Steagall6" boundary still serves to separate trust account and other fiduciary
responsibilities of commerical banks from the distribution and marketing
of securities, and to preserve inter-industry rivalry. Both commercial
banking, along with thrift institutions, and securities have ample compe-

tition within their own ranks, and the largest commercial banks need not
dominate the securities industry.6' Whether commercial banks should be
58. Some consumer advocates urge stronger federal regulation, and certain industry professionals have endorsed federalized regulation. Most insurance companies, however, prefer
the state regulatory tradition because it is familiar, comfortable, and largely favorable to their
interests. See W. LovETr, supra note 1, at 330-33. But more industry professionals might
support federal regulation, if necessary, as a defense against a general takeover of their industry by commercial .anking.
In any event, we should preserve accountability, supervision, and adequate reserves, and
provide insolvency insurance for most companies in the industry. A push from overextended
international banks to quickly consummate many acquisitions of large insurance companies
and from safe regional banks to replenish their consolidated bank balance sheets and earnings
does not justify disrupting insurance markets. Moreover, the competence of giant bank bureaucracies might now be questioned, especially in light of their overlending to third world
nations. See supra note 36.
Meanwhile, insurance companies and agents make the following arguments against letting
banks sell or underwrite insurance: (1) the powerful leverage of banks as lenders can distort
insurance decisions; (2) coercion-tying dangers may arise; (3) invasions of privacy may arise
from bank misuse of checking account, borrower, and other financial data; (4) underwriting
reserves may be threatened; (5) excessively concentrated economic power could result; and (6)
many insurance companies, their marketing networks, and independent insurance agents could
suffer undue disruption and losses.
59. See W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at 135-38, 261-97, 382-97 (1984).
60. Hearings on Financial Deregulation, supra note 2, at 95 (testimony of William A.
Lovett).
61. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1976).
62. Securities marketing is a much smaller industry in the aggregate. In 1984, securities
firms (and "investment" bankers) may have had roughly $120 billion in assets, and perhaps
$10-12 billion in equity. Commercial banks, by contrast, had about $2000 billion in assets and
$120 billion in equity. Insurance companies had perhaps $750 billion in assets. W. LOVETr,
supra note 1, at 264-66.
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allowed to affiliate with discount brokers is a closer question, but the
courts have allowed this recently.6 3
The boundaries between insurance, commercial banking, and securities have been useful as wellfr4 Insurance companies and banks are
strong competitors in managing pension fund resources, along with some
independent union and association pension plans. The three industries
compete against each other for tax-sheltered investments and retirement
accounts. While the banks seek some additional insurance marketing
and underwriting authority, Congress should move cautiously in allowing increased rivalry. We should avoid disrupting the soundness of
insurance companies, reserves, capital accounts, and the insurance distri-

bution system, which plays such a strong role in small business enterprise
and local community life throughout the country.
Finally, we should try to preserve the great competitive benefits of
our tripartite financial services sector, with its strongly decentralized
character: 6 (1) commercial banking is decentralized and competitive,
and further disciplined by rivalry from thrift institutions in every state;
(2) insurance underwriting is decentralized and competitive nationally,
though more highly concentrated than banking; and (3) securities distri-

bution and marketing are more concentrated nationally, but highly competitive as a risk capital market. These industries have kept each other
on their toes competitively, and effectively serve the public interest.

It would be a serious mistake to convert these industries into a
highly concentrated, nationwide oligopoly of giant conglomerates
through a massive stampede of needless mergers. 6 Leveraged buyouts,
63. Congress seems likely to accept this extension of banking activity. See J. WHITE & E.
SYMONS, BANKING LAW 463-95 (1984) (particularly the "Schwab" decision, Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984).
64. See W. LOVETr, supra note 1, at chs. 3-8. But see GOLEMBE ASSOCIATES, INC., COMMERCIAL BANKING AND THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACr (Feb. 18, 1982) (prepared for the Ameri-

can Bankers Association); Byland, US. Banks Respond to Market Pressures, BANKER, Feb.
1984, at 85; Taylor, Deregulationand the Banking Image, BANKERS MAG., July-Aug. 1984, at
10; Sandier, Entry Problems:Investment Banking Proves a Tough Fieldfor Commercial Banks,
Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 6; ParteeSees DeregulationLeading to Need for Increased
Supervision, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 618 (1984).
65. Decentralization, local banking, and regional balance would be much more difficult to
maintain if banking, insurance, and securities were scrambled together into conglomerate organizations. The traditions of state supervision and dual regulation would be greatly weakened,
and only federal regulation would be likely to sustain some vitality.
66. In the long run, it would be difficult to prevent massive consolidation into nationwide
financial conglomerates. Securities and insurance are much more concentrated than banking,
and allowing consolidated conglomerates from all three industries (and perhaps major retailing
networks like Sears) would convert banking into a far more concentrated nationwide industry,
with a weak competitive fringe. This transformation would eliminate the rivalry of separate
industries-banking, securities and insurance.
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merger mania, fearful managements, and promoter profits could achieve

this result within a few years, especially with current laxity in antitrust
enforcement. 67 This transformation would reduce substantially the competitive bargaining power of small business and typical families in dealing
with financial markets. Effective interest rates on loans and borrowing
would increase for all but larger corporations, and deposit interest rates
would decline for small firms and ordinary families. 68 Services to individuals and small business would erode in quality. We would eliminate

one of the great strengths and guarantees of decentralized free enterprise,
the separation and independence of financial intermediation from large
industrial corporations.6 9 Our present capital and financial markets
function quite well on the whole. They are highly automated and computerized and becoming more efficient this way. It would be an enormous blunder to destroy the benefits of decentralized competition and
rivalry in our financial services industries.
67. With respect to leveraged buyout incentives, see J. WHITE & E. SYMONS, BANKING
LAW 374-76 (1984); Osborn, Leveraged Buyouts: Too Good to Be True?, EUROMONEY, Apr.
1984, at 20; Gelman & Tsuruoka, The CaseforStrippingBanks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1984, at
80; Brown, Goodbye to Greenmail,EUROMONEY, Sept. 1984, at 14; Morton & Corbett, Market
Repositioning: The Challengefor Medium-Sized Banks, BANKERS MAG., May-June 1984, at
60; Wallace, Investing: RegionalBanks are Still Bargains,N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at F10,
col. 2; Bleakley, The Merger Makers' SpiralingFees, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1984, at Fl, col. 2;
Gordon, Merger Mania in Pennsylvania, EURONOMONEY, Sept. 1984, at 121.
With respect to laxity in current antitrust law, see W. LovETT, supra note 1, at ch. 3;
Hearings on FinancialDeregulation,supra note 2, at 692-779 (testimony of Arnold A. Heggestad); J. BURKE, ANTITRUST LAWS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, AND THE LIMITS OF
CONCENTRATION IN LOCAL BANKING MARKETS, Staff Studies No. 138 (1984) (Federal Reserve

Board); S. RHOADES,

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK MERGER POLICY OF FINANCIAL

DEREGULATION, INTERSTATE BANKING, AND FINANCIAL SUPERMARKETS, Staff Studies No.

137 (1984) (Federal Reserve Board); The Future of Small Depository Institutions in an Era of
Deregulation,FinancialInnovation and Technological Change in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE AT THE BOARD OF GOvERNoRS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Jan. 23, 1984).

68. Extensive literature shows that high concentration in local banking markets means
somewhat higher charges and fees to smaller borrowers, and somewhat less generous conditions for smaller depositors. Larger business borrowers and depositors, on the other hand,
have access to much stronger regional or even national competition for these purposes. See,
e.g., Shepherd & Heggestad, The Banking Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (W. Adams 6th ed. 1982). Major increases in concentration, with powerful, multimarket institutions and conglomerates, would substantially raise barriers to new entry and
potential competition as well.
69. Much better small business opportunities, easier capital formation, and more efficient
financial intermediation flow from a highly deconcentrated, extremely competitive financial
system. If, by contrast, banking and finance were dominated by large conglomerates, this
traditional independence and ease of access to borrowing and credit could be substantially
weakened.
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Regulatory Organization

The American network of financial institutions regulation is adapted
to its federal tradition, which includes the separation of banking, thrift
institutions, securities marketing, and the underwriting of various types

of insurance. We have developed sound patterns of teamwork and data
sharing among most of the regulatory agencies. 70 We should not alter

these arrangements without good reasons. If things function effectively,
drastic changes are unnecessary.
In banking and thrift institution regulation, significant change at
this stage in regulatory organization is unwarranted. 7 1 Because of dual
chartering, a sound tradition that few challenge, we need federal state
chartering and examination authorities. The Treasury Department, a
major influence upon the economy, is a sensible place for the Comptroller or a Federal Banking Commission. 72 But the Federal Reserve, as our

central bank and money market regulator, needs strong regulatory authority to perform its functions, especially in light of the continuing
world debt crisis. We should realize, in addition, that the Federal Reserve has a much stronger and more talented staff. Federal deposit insurance and examination discipline is needed by state and federal banks
alike, and is best provided by a strong, independent agency such as the

FDIC, which is not prejudiced in favor of larger national banks, like the
Office of Comptroller of Currency (OCC).73 Meanwhile, thrift institu70. Traditions of regulatory data sharing and collaboration have become highly sophisticated. See W. LovETr, supra note 1, at 100-26; J. WHITE, BANKING LAW (1976); C.
GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1983-84, at 66-74 (1984).
71. As Senator Jake Garn observed in the 1984 hearings, the resolution of broader powers
and altered boundaries among financial institutions probably would precede any significant
rearrangement of regulatory authority for banks, thrift institutions, securities firms, or insurance companies. As Senator Garn remarked, "powers, and authorities first" and "powers need
to be determined first before you go to regulation or geographical distribution." Hearingson
Competitive Equity, supra note 2, at 1169-70.
If, however, banking, insurance, and securities marketing are permitted altogether for
financial conglomerates and holding companies, with significant interconnection of resources,
reserves, and facilities, then regulation, supervision and accountability will need to expand
accordingly. Ultimately, all three industries probably would require effective regulation at the
national level, with closely coordinated federal agencies.
72. Most other countries place banking regulation under their central banks or finance
ministries. See, e.g., INTER-BANK RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, THE REGULATION OF BANKS
IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECC (1978); H. BAER, THE BANKING SYSTEM OF SWITZERLAND (1964); S. BRONTE, JAPANESE FINANCE: MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (1982).
73. Historically, at least during the last generation, the OCC has been a weaker, less talented, and substantially less representative agency than the Federal Reserve. The OCC has
tended to favor the interests of larger national banks, and has become at times, some complain,
almost a lobbying organization for bigger banks. Whatever Federal Banking Commission
should succeed the roles of the OCC and FDIC, it should be carefully structured to represent
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tions are better supervised and insured by their own agencies, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, the FSLIC, and the National Credit Union
Administrator, with the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund
(NCUSIF). Coordination disciplines have been successful in recent years
under the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, and the

Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee was useful in implementing some aspects of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980. 74
Proposals are being advanced now among scholars, though hardly

among financial institutions, that federal deposit insurance (FDIC,
FSLIC, and NCUSIF) should be abolished and replaced with "risk oriented" private deposit insurance." Such thinking reflects serious naivete
and ignorance of banking history and a long series of banking panics and
depressions. Most responsible economists around the world repudiate

this thinking, but it is worth restating the logic behind government deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort support for banks and deposi-

tory institutions. Even though private insurance might be sufficient for
large, regional, and community banks equally. A system of defined representative board members, somewhat like the Federal Reserve Bank, should be employed, with one member for
multinational banks, another for regional banks, and another for community banks, with perhaps two public members.
74. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
75. FDIC Chairman Isaac has been supporting risk-oriented FDIC insurance premiums.
See Hearings on Competitive Equity, supra note 2, at 1281-86 (statement of William M. Isaac);
Hearings on FinancialDeregulation,supra note 2, at 1588-97 (statement of William M. Isaac).
See also Isaac Warns of Bank Nationalization: Predicts 75 Bank Failuresfor Year, 43 WASH.
FIN. REP. 653 (1984). Closely related to this effort is more market discipline and moral hazard
for larger depositors. See Hertzberg, FDIC Handlingof Latest Bank Failuresis Another Step
to Disciplinethe System, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1984. See also Furlong, FDIC'sModified Payout
Plan, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER, May. 18, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco);
Keran & Furlong, The FederalSafety Net for CommercialBanks, FRBSF WEEKLY LETrER,
July 27-Aug. 3, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco); Bennett & Pyle, Risk-Adjusted
Deposit InsurancePremiums, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER, Aug. 10, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco); Bennett, Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER, Aug. 17, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco); Scadding, Insuranceand Managing Bank Risk-Taking, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER, Oct. 19, 1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco). David Pyle justifiably asserts:
[D]eregulation is increasing the scope for risk-taking by banks and other depository
institutions. These include new asset and product line activities, such as real estate
and insurance; the increased uncertainties of coping with deposit rate competition;
and financial innovations such as brokered funds, which allow banks to raise funds
nationally and to reduce their reliance on local markets in which they are better
known. . . [I]mproved monitoring and control of bank activities to prevenlt insolvency may be more important than differentially pricing risk in protecting the insurance funds.
Scadding, Insurance and Managing Bank Risk-Taking, FRBSF WEEKLY LE=1 R, Oct. 19,
1984 (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) (citing Pyle, Deregulation and Deposit Insurance Reform, ECON. REv., Spring 1984, at 5 (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)).
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occasional bank failures, this would not adequately prevent more widespread financial panic from spreading in a chain reaction. Because most
modem nations use deposit insurance, central bank, and treasury support
for their banking networks, most of them now believe that old fashioned,
widespread financial panics and depressions will not occur again. There
may be leeway for variation of deposit insurance premium risks and differential rate charges. But implementing such a policy is not easy. Risk
variations among banks or other institutions are not simple to quantify.
For example, how should enhanced risks for major United States banks
due to LDC debt exposure be factored into premium structures? Realistically, the largest fifteen to twenty multinational banks now involve far
greater insolvency risks as a class than regional or community banks.76
How much greater? One hundred percent? Five hundred percent? One
thousand percent? Should these risks be publicized? Could confidentiality be justified under SEC accounting? Would publication increase the
strains upon international banking? Would rescheduling negotiations, already difficult, with some countries become even more awkward? Can
government bank regulators impose differential risk premiums with integrity and fairness against large and small banks or other financial institutions? Would this involve political influence?
The most important requirement today for regulation of banks and
financial institutions is continued vigilance, professionalism, and integrity. Recent strains upon the major multinational banks (resulting from
the recession in the early 1980's and LDC debt overloads) need continuing attention from federal authorities. Major runs and bank failures,
such as Continental Illinois and its de facto receivership, should be minimized. This requires stronger supervision, especially from the Federal
Reserve, together with skillful rescheduling of LDC debts and collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and other central banks.
76. See supra notes 36-40. Crucial questions are whether federal banking agencies would
have the courage to, or should, raise risk premiums for the top 10 to 15 multinational banks to
cover the risk of widespread LDC default. LDC debt exposure for the largest United States
banks now substantially exceeds their net capital. By some standards, most of the United
States multinational banks are "problem banks," i.e., with risk ratings of three to four under
present CAMEL criteria. CAMEL refers to five factors delineated according to Uniform Interagency Bank Rating System: (1) capital adequacy; (2) asset quality; (3) management ability;
(4) earnings performance; and (5) liquidity. For an explanation of the rating system, see W.
LOvETr, supra note 1, at 117; C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF

BANKING 1983-84, at 70-71 (1984). But see Conover Concedes U.S. is Unpreparedto Let Large
Money CenterBanks Fail,43 WASH. FIN. REP. 445 (1984). See also How Not to Run a MoneyCenterBank- The Report of ContinentalIllinois Corporation'sSpecial Litigation Committee,
INT'L CURRENCY REv., Sept. 1984, at 14.
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Congress should exercise its oversight function with greater vigor and
responsibility as trustee for the public interest.
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Appendix
Aggregate Concentration
Banks and Other Depository Institutions
Total Deposits and Assets ($ billions)
Consolidated
Deposits'

Percent of
Deposits

Consolidated
Assets1

Percent of
Assets

Commercial Banks
1,409.7
1,915.9
6.7% 3
Bank of America
94.3
122.2
6.8% 2
Citicorp
76.5
12.1%
130.0
13.2%3
56.9
80.9
Chase Manhattan
Manufacturer's Hanover
43.9
64.2
J. P. Morgan
37.9
58.9
First Interstate
30.5
40.9
Continental Illinois
28.2
42.9
Chemical New York
27.9
48.3
First Chicago
27.4
35.9
Security Pacific
25.8
37.0
Top Ten Commercial
31.9%
449.3
661.2
34.5%
Banks
Top Twenty Commercial
42.9%
885.4
46.2%
604.7
Banks
Top Fifty Commercial
791.8
56.2%
1,145.1
59.8%
Banks
Remaining 14,500
617.9
43.8%
40.2%
770.8
Commercial Banks
Savings and Loan
603.4
Associations (3,833
Institutions)
Mutual Savings Banks
207.9
(424 Institutions)
Credit Unions (20,000
80.8
Institutions)
Agencies and Branches
36.3
of Foreign Bank and
Edge and Agreement
Corps
Total All Deposits
2,338.1
1. Consolidated deposits and assets for top fifty United States banks as of September, 1983.
Data from Association of Bank Holding Companies.
2.

Citicorp 6.8% is asset leader.

3. Top two banks (Citicorp and Bank of America).
NOTE-The top twenty commercial banks have the large majority of international assets, or
$265 billion of $317 billion (84%). (Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Council of Economic
Advisors, Association of Bank Holding Companies).

